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Introduction
International activity of rms usually depends on access to external capital. Credit from outside investors is used to nance production costs, machinery, the purchase of material inputs, and up-front investments. Empirical studies show that access to external capital and nancial development are important determinants of trade activity. Countries with betterdeveloped nancial systems export relatively more in industries with higher dependence on external nance and lower asset tangibility (Beck, 2003; Svaleryd & Vlachos, 2005; Manova, 2008 Manova, , 2013 . Existing theoretical work builds on the interaction of credit constraints at the industry-or country-level with ex-ante rm heterogeneity a la Melitz (2003) , and shows negative e ects of credit frictions on trade ows (Manova, 2013; Chaney, 2013) . 1 These models typically focus on partial equilibrium and do not consider welfare implications.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the e ects of globalization on rm performance and welfare, when producers di er in their exposure to nancial frictions and borrowing costs are endogenous. A novel feature of this model is that rm heterogeneity results from the interaction between capital market imperfections at the country-level and credit constraints at the rm-level. Producers require external capital to cover production costs and di er in their incentive to divert external funds, while being homogenous in other respects. This rmspeci c moral hazard problem reduces the pledgeability of sales and causes credit-rationing for some producers. Firm heterogeneity arises if nancial institutions are imperfect, as only a fraction of rms can overcome credit frictions and behaves optimally. Producers with high incentives to misbehave face credit-rationing and have to restrict production. Hence, the share of nancially constrained rms is endogenous in our model.
As a second departure from previous theoretical work, we explicitly model a capital market equilibrium which determines the interest rate. 2 We analyze the e ects of globalization and show that adjustments of capital costs represent an additional channel which reduces common gains from trade. Trade liberalization increases the market size as well as competition through entry of foreign rms. A positive market size e ect induces output expansion of all rms, raises capital demand, and thus leads to upward pressure on the interest rate. Higher borrowing costs, as well as stronger foreign competition, lead to a larger fraction of nancially constrained producers. Hence, some initially unconstrained rms face creditrationing and have to set higher prices. Furthermore, existing constrained producers are hurt more by higher capital costs, leading to a reallocation of pro ts towards unconstrained rms. These two adjustments increase the within-industry variance of prices in the economy. We 1 See Foley & Manova (2014) for a review of the trade and nance literature. 2 One exception is Foellmi & Oechslin (2010) , which we discuss below.
consider the indirect utility associated with quadratic preferences as a welfare measure. As consumers dislike price heterogeneity, a higher within-industry variance represents a negative welfare channel of globalization.
To motivate our theoretical model, we exploit enterprise survey data from the World Bank and highlight three novel empirical patterns. First, we use the ratio of tangible assets over total assets as a proxy for access to external nance, and show that the majority of variation in this measure is across rms within industries rather than between industries. This pattern is consistent with empirical studies showing that nancial health and access to external nance are important determinants of export and innovation activity, even after controlling for rm characteristics, such as size and productivity. 3 The high within-industry heterogeneity with respect to credit constraints motivates the analysis of rm-speci cnancial frictions in our theoretical model. Second, we show that in industries with a higher degree of competition, a larger fraction of rms is nancially constrained. Third, more nancially constrained industries and countries with lower nancial development show a larger variance of rm sales and a higher share of credit-rationed producers. 4 All relationships hold after controlling for rm characteristics such as productivity or size.
Our theoretical model provides a rationale for these patterns. A higher degree of competition captures that consumers react more sensitive to price increases. This competition e ect reduces rm sales and thus the pledgeable income, such that more producers become nancially constrained. Lower nancial development corresponds to weaker contract enforcement which results in stronger credit frictions. Hence, a larger fraction of producers faces nancial constraints and rm-level di erences in pledgeability translate into larger within-industry heterogeneity in sales.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on capital market imperfections in international trade. Theoretical work introduces credit frictions in trade models with heterogeneous rms. 5 This strand of literature di ers regarding (i) the usage of external funds (e.g. trade related xed or variable costs), (ii) the theoretical motivation of nancial constraints (e.g. moral hazard, imperfect contractibility, information asymmetry), and (iii) the underlying preference structure (e.g. CES vs. linear demand). To the best of our knowledge, this model is the rst to introduce rm-speci c credit frictions based on moral hazard, which leads to heterogeneity with respect to rm performance in the absence of ex-ante 3 See Berman & H ericourt (2010) , Minetti & Zhu (2011) , Gorodnichenko & Schnitzer (2013) , and Muûls (2015) , among others. 4 The link between credit frictions and international trade is particularly relevant in developing countries where the quality of nancial institutions is low (Banerjee & Du o, 2005 , 2014 .
5 See e.g. Muûls (2008) , Manova (2013) , and Chaney (2013) for extensions of the Melitz (2003) model by nancial frictions. Peters & Schnitzer (2015) introduce borrowing constraints in the framework of Melitz & Ottaviano (2008) . productivity or wealth di erences. Related to that, in Yeaple (2005) , technology choice and di erent skill levels across workers generate rm heterogeneity among initially homogenous producers. In a dynamic model of trade and nance, Felbermayr & Spiegel (2014) introduce heterogeneity in default probabilities which results in rm-speci c borrowing rates.
Existing work analyzes the e ects of credit frictions on product markets in general equilibrium without explicitly modelling capital markets. One exception is Foellmi & Oechslin (2010) , who also consider an endogenous interest rate determined by capital market clearing. However, the focus of their approach is a di erent one. In a model with CES preferences and heterogeneity in wealth, they analyze the distributive impact of trade liberalization in lessdeveloped countries. The authors show that globalization impedes access to external nance, especially for poor entrepreneurs, resulting in an increase of income inequality in the economy. In our setting with linear demand, we can disentangle the market size from the competition e ect and separately analyze their impacts on equilibrium outcomes. In contrast to a model with CES preferences, markups are endogenous and thus a ected by pro-competitive e ects of globalization. The advantage of our framework is its high tractability, which allows us to explicitly solve for all endogenous variables, and to conduct comparative static analysis with respect to nancial development and globalization. Furthermore, we derive welfare and show how capital market adjustments alter the gains from trade. Another paper that analyzes the welfare implications of credit frictions is Formai (2013) . In a general equilibrium framework based on Melitz (2003) , she shows how credit frictions distort the entry decision of producers, whereas trade liberalization can lead to negative welfare e ects.
In our framework, the crucial mechanism in general equilibrium is the endogenous adjustment of the interest rate after globalization. Therefore, our analysis is related to models that study how credit frictions a ect international capital and trade ows. In a Heckscher-Ohlin model with heterogeneous nancial frictions across countries and sectors, Antr as & Caballero (2009) show that trade integration increases the interest rate in nancially underdeveloped countries. Whereas this result is driven by specialization and across-sector reallocation of inputs, in our model interest rate adjustments after globalization lead to within-sector reallocation of market shares between constrained and unconstrained rms.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides empirical motivation for our theoretical setup. Section 3 presents the theoretical model and discusses comparative statics in partial equilibrium. The following section introduces the capital market and discusses general equilibrium e ects of globalization. Section 5 shows simulation results of the gains from globalization in both partial and general equilibrium. In section 6, we extend the model by free entry and show that the e ects of globalization remain robust, and nally, section 7 concludes.
Empirical motivation
In this section, we present new empirical patterns by exploiting rm-level data from the World Bank. The empirical analysis is entirely descriptive and aims to motivate our theoretical framework. First, we show that a substantial fraction of the total variation in the exposure to nancial constraints is across rms within industries rather than between industries. This pattern implies that credit frictions at the rm-level are important and that producers within the same industry face very di erent degrees of credit rationing. Second, a higher degree of competition is associated with a larger fraction of nancially constrained rms. Third, more nancially constrained industries and countries with lower nancial development show a larger variance of rm sales and a higher share of credit-rationed producers. The rst subsection describes the data set and variables used. The second subsection presents empirical patterns that motivate our theoretical model.
Data description
We use cross-sectional rm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES). 6 Following existing rm-level studies, the rst part of the analysis uses the ratio of tangible assets over total assets (T OA) as a proxy for access to external nance. We measure tangible assets as land and buildings which re ects the availability of collateral and thus better access to credit. 7 We use this continuous proxy for credit access to investigate the variation in the exposure to nancial constraints across rms within industries and between industries. Additionally, we are interested in the degree of product competition at the rm-as well as the industry-level. Therefore, we exploit a survey question which asks rms to assess the impact of a hypothetical price increase by 10% for their main product on own demand. The answers are captured by a categorical variable, whereas a value of 1 re ects that consumers are insensitive to the price increase (low competition), and a value of 4 means that customers would stop buying (high competition). We use variation of this variable at the rm-level and compute the industry mean. Furthermore, we compute the mean of tangible over total assets by industry and country and relate it to the variance in log sales across rms. Variables are reported in local currency units, which we convert it to 2005 U.S. dollars. For the rst part of the empirical motivation, we exploit a cross-section for the period 2002-2005. As information on competition and tangible assets is not available for all countries, we restrict Table 5 in Appendix 9.1 provides summary statistics of the variables of interest and shows the number of observations.
The second part of the empirical analysis further investigates the relationship between nancial constraints and the variance of rm sales at the country-level. Therefore, we exploit cross-section data for the years 2009 and 2013 which is available for a larger set of countries. 8 We use domestic credit to the private sector in percentage of GDP as a proxy for nancial development and relate it to the within-country variance of rm sales as well as the share of nancially constrained producers by country. 9 To obtain the latter measure, we consider a survey question which asks rms to state whether access to nancing (including availability and costs) is an obstacle to the current operations of the establishment. The categorical variable ranges from 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle). 10 We introduce a dummy variable for nancially constrained producers which takes the value of 1 if rms perceive access to nancing as a major or very severe obstacle (values 3 and 4 of the categorical variable). We take means by country as a measure for credit constraints. 
Empirical results
The rst pattern decomposes the total variation in the measure for credit access (tangible over total assets) into within-and between-industry variation. The literature on international trade stresses the importance of rm heterogeneity. Hence, one concern could be that the within-industry variation is mainly driven by di erences in rm characteristics such as size or productivity. To address this, we include a set of rm-level controls related to productivity, size, legal status and ownership structure. Figure 1 shows results for ve countries at three levels of industry aggregation and reveals that a substantial part of the variation is within industries. The observed pattern suggests that producers within the same industry are a ected very di erently by credit constraints, even after controlling for other rm characteristics. 11
Empirical pattern 1 The majority of variation in nancial constraints is across rms within industries rather than between industries.
In the following, we relate measures of credit constraints at the industry-as well as the country-level to the degree of competition and to the variance of sales. To motivate the main features of our theoretical model, we focus on simple pairwise correlations in the main text. Empirical studies show that larger and more productive rms are less credit-constrained. Hence, a major concern is that the correlations are driven by rm characteristics. Therefore, we conduct a regression analysis in Appendix 9.2 and show that our results are robust when we include rm-and industry controls. Furthermore, we relate the degree of competition to credit constraints. Table 1 shows the correlations both at the rm-as well as the industry-level. Firms that report more price-sensitive consumers face stronger credit-rationing. The positive relationship holds at the industry-level as well, whereas in industries with a higher degree of competition a larger fraction of producers is nancially constrained. 12 27,474 1,590 Notes: *** indicates 1%, and ** 5% signi cance.
Empirical pattern 2 Industries with a higher degree of product competition show a larger fraction of nancially constrained rms.
As a next step, we use the mean of the rm-level tangible assets over total assets ratio to compute a measure for credit access at the industry-level. We relate this proxy to the within-industry variation of rm sales. The left panel of Figure 2 depicts within-industry variances of rm-level sales, whereas the right panel shows results at the country-level. To compute the within-industry variances, we restrict our analysis to sectors with more than 25 rm observations. Figure 2 shows that industries with a higher ratio of tangible over total assets are characterized by a lower within-industry variance of rm sales. This relationship is signi cantly negative after controlling for industry e ects and rm characteristics (see Table  10 in Appendix 9.2).
We use more recent cross-section data of the WBES for the years 2009 and 2013, which is available for a larger set of countries, to investigate the relationship between nancial development and rm heterogeneity at the country-level. For the year 2009, the left panel of Figure 3 shows a signi cantly negative relationship between domestic credit provided to the private sector (in % of GDP) and the within-country variance of rm sales. Furthermore, the right panel depicts that higher nancial development is associated with a lower share of nancially constrained rms within a country. Table 2 summarizes the correlation coecients for both years and further shows that the share of nancially constrained producers is positively related to the variance of rm sales in a country. 13 12 Table 9 in Appendix 9.2 shows that the positive relationship between competition and credit constraints remains robust after controlling for rm characteristics, as well as year and country xed e ects.
13 Tables 10 and 11 in Appendix 9.2 show that empirical pattern 3 still holds after controlling for rm Empirical pattern 3 More nancially constrained industries and countries with lower nancial development are characterized by a larger variance of rm sales, as well as a higher share of credit-rationed producers.
Motivated by the rst empirical pattern, the next section introduces a new international trade model with heterogeneity in credit frictions at the rm-level. Our theoretical framework provides a rationale for empirical patterns 2 and 3. Furthermore, we analyze how globalization induces di erential e ects across rms within industries in the presence of credit frictions. The next section presents the setup of the theoretical model. characteristics and industry e ects. For the year 2013, Figure 10 in Data Appendix 9.1 shows the relationship between nancial development and within-country heterogeneity, whereas Figure 11 relates the share of nancially constrained rms to the within-country variance of rm sales.
The model
This section develops a model of international trade with heterogeneity in credit frictions at the rm-level. The world economy consists of k identical countries, each of which is populated by a number of L consumers and an exogenous mass of m producers. We motivate nancial frictions by a simple moral hazard problem between borrowing rms and external investors.
The following subsection presents the demand side of the model, whereas we assume a quadratic speci cation of preferences and derive market demand by aggregating over the number of consumers in the economy. Section 3.2 shows how rms optimally behave in the presence of capital market imperfections depending on their exposure to nancial frictions. The industry equilibrium, outlined in section 3.3, is determined by total industry output and an endogenous share of credit-rationed producers. Finally, in section 3.4, we analyze the e ects of globalization and of an interest rate shock in partial equilibrium.
Consumer side
The representative consumer's utility is de ned over per variety consumption q(i) and total consumption Q R i2 q(i)di, where the index i represents one variety and is the set of horizontally di erentiated products:
The quadratic utility function depends on the non-negative preference parameters a, b and on an inverse measure of product di erentiation e which lies between 0 and 1. Lower values of e imply that products are more di erentiated and hence less substitutable. If e = 1, consumers have no taste for diversity in products and demand depends on aggregate output Q only. Thus, the parameter e determines the degree of product market competition and is closely related to the competition variable in our empirical motivation. Consumers maximize utility in equation (1) subject to the budget constraint R i2 p(i)q(i)di I, where p (i) denotes the price for variety i and I is individual income. 14 The maximization problem yields the linear inverse demand function:
where is the marginal utility of income, the Lagrange multiplier attached to the budget constraint. As rms are in nitesimally small in the economy, they take as given. In the following, we set the marginal utility of income as the num eraire equal to one. 15 To ensure market-clearing, total output of each rm equals the aggregate demand of all consumers in the world economy: x(i) = kLq(i). Hence, the inverse world market demand is given by:
where a is the consumers' maximum willingness to pay and b 0 b kL is an inverse measure for the market size. Finally, X R i2 x (i) di represents the total volume of varieties produced and consumed in the world economy.
Firm's maximization problem
The industry consists of an exogenous mass of m rms, each producing a horizontally differentiated variety i. 16 Firms receive revenues p(i)x(i) and have to nance total variable production costs cx(i) by external capital. There are no xed costs of production. Motivated by empirical pattern 1 we assume that rms di er in their exposure to credit constraints. While producers are homogenous in marginal production costs c, the interaction of rm-level credit frictions and capital market imperfections creates rm heterogeneity. If nancial institutions are imperfect, only a fraction of producers can overcome credit frictions, receives the required capital amount and is able to produce the optimal output. In contrast, rms with high exposure to credit constraints su er from underprovision of external capital and cannot behave optimally. In equilibrium, the share of nancially unconstrained rms is endogenously determined and a ected by trade shocks. As we are interested in the e ects of globalization on producers with di erent exposure to credit constraints, we do not consider endogenous entry and exit decisions. In the following, we describe the rm's maximization problem and introduce credit frictions at the rm-as well as the country-level.
The decision problem of a producer consists of two stages. At date t = 0, the rm borrows the credit amount d(i) from an outside investor at the interest rate r. In partial equilibrium, the interest rate is treated as exogenous, whereas we endogenize it in general equilibrium as discussed in section 4. To motivate credit frictions at the rm-level, we introduce a managerial action which is non-veri able for outside investors and hence prone to moral hazard. 17 After credit provision, the manager of the rm can choose whether to use the external funds for production or divert the credit amount and invest it for own purposes. At date t = 1, production yields pro ts which consist of revenues net of loan repayment:
whereas the rm faces the following budget constraint:
Alternatively, the manager can choose to divert the loan without using the provided capital in the production process. In this case, no revenues are realized and the loan cannot be repaid. Instead the manager reaps a share (i) (1 ) of the credit amount d(i) and invests it on the capital market at interest rate r. Hence, the non-veri able private bene t from managerial misbehavior at date t = 1 is equal to rd(i) (i) (1 ). This private bene t consists of a country-speci c and a rm-level component. We follow and assume that private bene ts are negatively related to the quality of nancial institutions captured by the parameter 2 [0; 1] : Countries with better nancial institutions (larger ) tend to enforce laws that limit the ability of managers to divert funds or enjoy private bene ts. 18 In contrast to standard moral hazard approaches, we assume that producers are uniformly distributed at the unit interval and are heterogeneous in (i) 2 [0; 1], which we denote the agency costs of a rm i. A higher (i) increases the private bene t and thus the incentive for managerial misbehavior. This assumption introduces heterogeneity in credit constraints at the rm-level. The agency costs (i) can be interpreted in two ways. First, the parameter may capture di erences in managerial incentives to divert external funds. This could be the case if managers attach di erent values to the misuse of loans. Second, a high (i) might re ect a larger scope for managerial misbehavior as investment projects are opaque or corporate control is weak. To prevent misbehavior of agents and thus losses from lending, investors have to ensure that the following incentive constraint holds:
At period t = 1, pro ts in case of production and loan repayment have to be (weakly) higher than private bene ts in case of misbehavior. Rearranging equation (6) shows that moral hazard restricts the borrowing capacity:
Firms with high agency costs (i) derive large private bene ts from diverting the loan. Hence, investors restrict credit provision to prevent managerial misbehavior. If nancial institutions are perfect ( = 1), managers have no incentives to misbehave and equation (6) collapses to a zero-pro t condition. In this case, di erences in agency costs (i) play no role and rms are homogenous. In contrast, if nancial institutions are imperfect ( < 1), rm-speci c moral hazard divides agents into two groups. First, producers with relatively low (i) choose the optimal output level as the nancial constraint is not binding. Second, rms with higher agency costs face credit rationing and have to restrict production. To solve for outputs and prices, rms maximize pro ts (4) subject to the budget constraint (5) and the nancial constraint (7).
Constrained rms For rms with high agency costs (i), the nancial constraint is binding such that the constrained price equals the e ective marginal production costs:
Producing one unit of the good yields the price p C ( ) which has to compensate for the marginal production costs cr and the opportunity costs of diligent behavior cr (i) (1 ). The quantity of credit-rationed producers is given by:
More nancially constrained rms with a higher value of (i) face larger opportunity costs of production and have to set higher prices which results in lower outputs.
Unconstrained rms For unconstrained rms, the nancial constraint is not binding such that optimal output is independent of (i):
By inserting equation (10) into the inverse demand function (3), we derive the optimal price of unconstrained rms:
In our model, the only source of rm heterogeneity occurs in . As optimal output (10) and prices (11) do not depend on , all unconstrained producers behave in the same way. It can be shown that unconstrained rms charge lower prices and o er larger quantities compared to credit-rationed producers. Figure 4 : Output pro le of constrained and unconstrained rms
Industry equilibrium
In equilibrium, we derive a critical value of agency costs e above which rms are nancially constrained. We exploit that for the marginal unconstrained producer the nancial constraint (6) is just binding and insert the optimal output from equation (10), which leads to: e = a b 0 eX cr (2 e) (1 ) cr :
The share of nancially constrained rms is given by 1 e , which corresponds to the fraction in empirical patterns 2 and 3. In a particular industry, a fraction e of rms is unconstrained and chooses the identical optimal output as shown in Figure 4 . Following equation (9), output of constrained rms decreases in agency costs . Consistent with our empirical motivation, the share of nancially constrained rms depends on nancial development and the degree of competition. We show that a higher degree of product market competition (larger e) reduces e , conditional on industry characteristics:
@ e @e = a cr 2b 0 X (1 ) (2 e) 2 cr < 0:
Proposition 1 The share of unconstrained rms e decreases in the degree of competition e. Proof. Equation (13) is negative if X > a cr 2b 0 . Exploiting expression (10) and rearranging yields X > x U , which is always satis ed.
The negative relationship between e and e corresponds to our empirical motivation. The survey question exploited in empirical pattern 2 captures the price sensitivity that a producer faces within an industry. A larger substitutability increases the degree of competition as consumers react more sensitive to an increase in prices. This is captured by the parameter e in our model. Consistent with empirical pattern 3, a higher quality of nancial institutions reduces the fraction of credit-rationed producers. Furthermore, conditional on industry output X, the fraction of unconstrained producers decreases in credit costs cr.
To arrive at an output pro le as depicted in Figure 4 , we impose two conditions. First, to ensure that both groups of rms occur, the threshold value e has to be smaller than one.
Second, the output of the rm with the highest agency costs, (i) = 1, has to be positive. Otherwise it would not be active in the market.
Inserting Condition 2 in equation (12) leads to a lower limit value for the share of unconstrained rms e l = 1 2 e . To determine the industry equilibrium, average output e x in the economy can be expressed as:
Inserting the optimal outputs (9) and (10) in equation (14) and aggregating leads to:
with 0 c 1 1 e R 1 e (i) di being the average agency costs within the group of constrained producers. Figure 5 depicts the industry equilibrium. As the world economy consists of m producers in k countries, the aggregate output is given by: X = kme x. Equations (12) and (15) represent two relationships between the endogenous variables e and e
x.
The curve Cutof f : e (e x) illustrates equation (12) and determines the fraction of nancially constrained m Cutoff:
Scale: Figure 5 : Industry equilibrium and trade liberalization rms dependent on average industry output. Intuitively, the negative slope captures the fact that higher industry scale increases competition and forces more rms into the constrained status. The curve Scale: e
x e is derived from equation (15) and re ects that with a higher critical value e more rms are unconstrained and thus choose optimal output levels. Hence, average industry scale increases. The intersection of the two curves in Figure 5 characterizes the industry equilibrium.
Comparative statics in partial equilibrium
The previous section has characterized the partial equilibrium in the economy. In a next step, we investigate how globalization and an exogenous change in the interest rate a ect the industry. All results are derived by total di erentiation of the two equilibrium conditions (12) and (15). See Appendix 8.1 for a detailed derivation. Furthermore, section 6 extends the model by free entry and endogenizes the number of producers.
Globalization Following Eckel & Neary (2010) , we interpret globalization as an increase in the number of countries k in the integrated world economy. This shock a ects optimal rm behavior through two channels. On the one hand, producers face a market size e ect which corresponds to an increase in the number of consumers L. On the other hand, globalization is associated with increased competition from foreign rms. Therefore, this competition e ect works like a rise in the number of producers m. To gain intuition for the e ects of globalization, we analyze the two channels separately.
From equation (3), we observe that a larger market rotates the inverse world demand outwards without a ecting the intercept. Thus, rms face a larger demand and raise output levels resulting in a one-to-one increase in industry scale. This market size e ect is counteracted but not outweighed by tougher competition. Consequently, globalization increases average industry scale: 
The positive market size e ects shifts the curve Scale: e x e upwards and the curve Cutof f : e (e x) outwards in Figure 5 . A larger market increases the pledgeable income and thus relaxes the nancial constraint (6). As Figure 5 shows, the change in market size does not a ect the share of credit-rationed producers in equilibrium. However, the competition e ect leads to a partial backward shift of the two curves. A greater number of competitors producing at a larger average scale e
x aggravates nancial constraints and increases the share of creditrationed rms: 
Tougher competition reduces rm revenues and therefore pledgeable income as shown by equation (7). If goods are perfectly di erentiated (e = 0), the competition e ect disappears and globalization leads to a one-to-one increase in output without a ecting the share of nancially constrained producers.
Proposition 2 In partial equilibrium, globalization increases industry scale as the positive market size e ect dominates the counteracting competition e ect. The latter increases the share of nancially constrained producers (lower e ).
Borrowing costs
In this section, we analyze the e ects of an exogenous change in the interest rate r. An increase in the borrowing costs reduces average industry scale e x and forces more producers into the constrained status:
d ln e x d ln r < 0 ; d ln e d ln r < 0:
Proposition 3 In partial equilibrium, an exogenous increase in the borrowing rate leads to a higher share of nancially constrained rms and reduces industry scale.
Proof. See Appendix 8.1.
For both groups, an increase in the borrowing rate has a direct negative impact on rm outputs, whereby the e ect is stronger for credit-rationed rms. By comparing equations (9) and (10), this can be explained by the agency problem which leads to higher e ective marginal production costs for nancially constrained producers. Whereas credit-rationed agents experience strong contraction, total di erentiation of equation (10) shows a counteracting competition e ect for unconstrained rms: 19
Besides the direct negative impact of an increase in the interest rate, unconstrained producers optimally react to the reduction in industry scale by an increase of individual output. If varieties are perfectly di erentiated (e = 0), the latter e ect vanishes and unconstrained rms clearly reduce sales. However, the larger is the substitutability of goods, the more unconstrained rms bene t from reductions of rival rms' outputs.
General equilibrium
The partial equilibrium analysis is based on the assumption that the interest rate is exogenously given. This implies that capital supply is completely elastic. In the next subsection, we endogenize the interest rate by introducing a simple capital market with xed supply. Our results can be interpreted as a short-run equilibrium as we abstract from endogenous entry and exit decisions of rms (see section 6 for an extension with free entry). Furthermore, we do not allow for adjustments of capital supply. After trade liberalization, the borrowing rate increases caused by higher capital demand. In the long-run, this e ect might be counteracted by an increase in capital supply or capital market liberalization. In the following, we analyze how endogenous adjustments of borrowing costs a ect the implications of globalization. Furthermore, we show the impact of nancial development in general equilibrium.
19 See Appendix 8.1 for an explicit derivation of the expression d ln e
x d ln r < 0.
Capital market clearing
Each rm has to cover variable production costs by external nance and hence demands cx j (i) units of capital, with j 2 C; U . We assume that the economy is endowed with a xed amount of capital K S . In equilibrium, the inelastic supply of capital has to be equal to total capital demand K D of m rms in a country:
By evaluating the equilibrium condition (20), we can explicitly solve for the interest rate: 
We add equation (20) to the system of equations from the partial equilibrium analysis (12) and (15). In general equilibrium, pro ts and capital income determine the aggregate income of consumers I. A rise in the interest rate r has no e ect on aggregate income as the resulting increase in capital income is exactly o set by a decrease in rm pro ts.
Comparative statics in general equilibrium
This section analyzes the e ects of globalization and changes in nancial development in general equilibrium. As capital market clearing pins down average industry scale e x, we express our equilibrium by two equations in the endogenous variables r and e . The curve CU T : e (r) in Figure 6 combines capital market clearing (20) with the nancial condition (12). Intuitively, the curve is downward sloping as a higher interest rate increases the share of nancially constrained rms and thus reduces the cuto value e . The curve CM E: r e is derived by inserting equation (20) into (15), and illustrates the relationship between r and e such that the capital market is in equilibrium. A higher share of unconstrained producers leads to an increase of average output and thus to higher capital demand. To ensure capital market clearing, the interest rate has to rise. 20
Globalization In general equilibrium, the xed capital amount determines average industry output. Therefore, in contrast to section 3.4, globalization (an increase in k) has no CUT: 
Globalization leads to an upward shift of the curve CM E: r e in Figure 6 . For a given share of nancially constrained rms, the dominating market size e ect increases capital demand resulting in a higher interest rate:
This result is based on the assumption of xed capital supply. An increase in the interest rate occurs as long as capital supply K S is not completely elastic and trade liberalization is not accompanied by large capital in ows. The curve CU T : e (r) is una ected such that the new equilibrium is characterized by the intersection point with the new capital market clearing condition. Consequently, the share of nancially constrained producers increases as higher borrowing costs impose stronger restrictions on the nancial constraint:
d ln e d ln k < 0:
Proposition 4 In general equilibrium, globalization increases the interest rate and the share of nancially constrained rms, but has no e ect on industry scale.
Proof. See Appendix 8.2.
Comparing equations (17) and (24) shows that globalization leads to a stronger increase in the share of nancially constrained producers in general equilibrium (see Appendix 8.2 for a formal proof). This result is driven by the endogenous increase in borrowing costs which forces more rms into the constrained status. In contrast to partial equilibrium, the increase in the interest rate leads to di erent rm responses after globalization:
The increase in the number of countries k a ects optimal rm behavior in two opposing ways. As shown in partial equilibrium, the market size e ect dominates the competition e ect which induces rms to increase outputs. The endogenous adjustment of the interest rate in general equilibrium counteracts the positive impact of globalization. The latter e ect especially hurts nancially constrained producers with high agency costs (i) shown by the larger weight of the interest rate in equation (26) compared to unconstrained rms (25).
Proposition 5 In general equilibrium, globalization leads to an output expansion among unconstrained rms, whereas nancially constrained producers have to reduce output due to increased capital costs.
The expansion among unconstrained rms is illustrated in Figure 7 by an upward shift of the output pro le. In contrast, credit-rationed producers su er from increased capital costs and thus decrease output depending on their agency costs. As the most constrained rm with = 1 faces the strongest output reduction, the constrained output pro le rotates clockwise. The slope is given by cr(1 ) b 0 (1 e) (compare equation (9)) and thus increases in the interest rate and the market size. The di erential responses across the two groups of producers increase the variance of output and prices within the industry. This result will be crucial for the welfare consequences which we discuss in more detail in section 5. As average industry scale is una ected due to xed capital supply, the output gain of unconstrained rms (region A in Figure 7 ) o sets the contraction of nancially constrained producers (region B).
Financial development An increase in reduces the incentives to reap private bene ts and thus enhances the pledgeability of revenues. This shock can be interpreted as an improvement of nancial contract enforcement. Comparable to trade liberalization, there is no e ect on aggregate output due to xed capital supply. However, an increase in relaxes the Figure 7 : Output pro les and globalization nancial constraint (6) and increases the share of unconstrained producers in the economy:
Furthermore, the increase in pledgeable income translates into higher capital demand and thus a higher borrowing rate: d ln r d ln > 0:
Note that this result holds under the assumption of xed capital supply. Hence, a higher quality of nancial institutions only a ects capital demand. 21
Proposition 6 In general equilibrium, higher nancial development decreases the share of nancially constrained rms. Proof. See Appendix 8.2.
An improvement in the quality of nancial institutions increases the borrowing capacity of credit-rationed rms. This direct positive e ect is counteracted by an increase in capital costs. Whereas nancially constrained rms expand output, unconstrained producers do not bene t from higher nancial development, but face a higher interest rate: Figure 8 : Output pro les and nancial development
Consequently, an increase in nancial development induces a reallocation of market shares towards credit-rationed producers. This e ect can be seen graphically by a downward shift of the unconstrained output pro le as well as an outward rotation of the output line for constrained rms in Figure 8 . Hence, higher nancial development reduces the withinindustry variance of sales, which provides a rationale for empirical pattern 3.
Proposition 7 In general equilibrium, higher nancial development reduces the variance of sales within an industry as nancially constrained rms expand outputs at the expense of unconstrained producers.
Welfare
This section analyzes how globalization a ects consumer welfare. In a rst step, we derive a welfare measure for a representative consumer. We use the latter for a numerical simulation of the e ects of trade liberalization on consumer welfare.
Indirect utility
As an appropriate measure for consumer welfare, we derive the indirect utility function for a representative consumer associated with the preference structure in equation (1). As we choose the marginal utility of income as num eraire ( = 1), indirect utility can be expressed as follows:
The welfare measure increases in the rst moments of prices for unconstrained and constrained rms respectively, p U = R e 0 p U di, p C = R 1 e p C ( )di, and decreases in the second moments of prices for both groups, 2 U = R e 0 (p U ) 2 di and 2 C = R 1 e (p C ( )) 2 di. The structure of the utility function is comparable to welfare measures in general oligopolistic equilibrium models. 22 In these papers, consumer welfare decreases in the variance of prices which in our case would be de ned as 2 j = 2 j p j 2 for j 2 C; U . Two important properties of the welfare function will be crucial for the subsequent analysis. Following from the preference structure in equation (1), consumers love variety and dislike heterogeneity in consumption levels and prices.
Welfare e ects of trade liberalization
The aim of this section is to analyze the welfare implications of globalization. We simulate the changes of consumer welfare (31) to globalization and compare results in partial and general equilibrium. 23 Similar to our previous analysis, we rst consider only the market size e ect of globalization (change in the number of consumers L). Subsequently, we take into account that trade liberalization increases competition and the number of varieties available to consumers (change in k).
Market size e ect The market size e ect re ects increased export opportunities after globalization. The left panel of Figure 9 shows that a larger market has no e ect on consumer welfare in partial equilibrium (PE), but leads to welfare losses in general equilibrium (GE). This di erence is driven by the endogenous adjustment of the borrowing rate when the capital market equilibrium is taken into account.
As equation (31) shows, consumer welfare depends on the rst and second moments of prices for both groups. In partial equilibrium, an increase in the market size L leads to a proportional expansion of output among all rms without a ecting optimal price setting and the share of unconstrained rms e (compare section 3.4). Therefore, consumer welfare does not respond to changes in the market size as the rst and second moments of prices Figure 9 : Welfare e ects of market size (L) and globalization (k) remain constant. In contrast, increased capital demand raises the interest rate in general equilibrium which leads to a higher variance of prices and thus to welfare losses. As discussed in section 4.2, higher borrowing costs increase the within-industry variance of prices in two ways. First, a larger fraction of rms becomes nancially constrained (lower e ). Second, unconstrained producers expand output at the expense of credit-rationed rms.
Globalization By considering the e ect of an increase in the number of countries k; we introduce two additional channels how globalization a ects consumer welfare (31). In contrast to the left graph, the right panel of Figure 9 shows that globalization leads to welfare gains both in partial and general equilibrium resulting from (i) lower prices due to increased competition and (ii) larger consumption variety. Importantly, the positive welfare e ects are considerably lower in general equilibrium. Whereas the partial equilibrium analysis re ects well-known gains from trade through competition and larger variety, our model stresses an additional negative welfare channel of globalization driven by an increase in capital costs. Whereas unconstrained rms bene t from trade liberalization due to the market size e ect, the higher interest rate especially hurts the most constrained producers (with high values of ). Compared to existing work, the negative welfare channel of a larger market is driven by two components of our model. First, the introduction of heterogeneity in nancial frictions at the rm-level induces endogenous selection of producers into unconstrained and constrained groups. Second, by considering capital market clearing in general equilibrium, the interest rate is endogenized and increases with globalization. In the presence of rmspeci c credit frictions and endogenous capital costs, trade liberalization leads to a larger variance of prices and reduces positive welfare e ects. Table 3 shows outcomes of endogenous variables for di erent values of market size L and the number of countries k. Policy implications The additional negative welfare channel of globalization is especially relevant if nancial development is low and credit frictions are signi cant. Thus, from a policy perspective, our model implies that trade liberalization should be accompanied by nancial reforms that aim to mitigate negative e ects. To do so, our theoretical framework suggests two potential policy measures: an improvement in the quality of nancial institutions or an increase in capital supply K S . Both measures reduce price heterogeneity and hence dampen potential welfare losses, but work through di erent channels. An increase in alleviates credit frictions and induces a reallocation of market shares towards nancially constrained producers (see the discussion in section 4.2). As a second measure, globalization should be accompanied by an increase in capital supply K S to weaken the increase in borrowing costs which bene ts all rms.
Model extension with free entry
Our model abstracts from endogenous entry and exit decisions of rms. In this section, we allow for free entry which endogenizes the number of rms m and show that the implications of the model are robust to this extension. Therefore, we introduce an entry stage at which each rm pays a xed cost f E and draws a value for which is uniformly distributed along the unit interval. Hence, before producers know their agency costs, expected pro ts E have to be equal to the entry costs:
whereas b is the agency cost parameter of the most credit-rationed rm in the market. This marginal producer is determined by
Conditions (32) and (33) determine the cuto value b and the number of rms m. Comparing equations (12) and (33) leads to the following relationship between the share of unconstrained rms and the cuto value: e = b 2 e . By using this property and evaluating equation (32), the cuto value can be expressed as follows:
) cr] 2 [e 2 (6 e) + 5 (2 3e)] :
We analyze how globalization a ects the economy with free entry and compare results to section 3.4. Analogous to equation (14), industry scale is now given by the average output of surviving rms:
which can be expressed as a function of b :
Hence, our equilibrium with free entry consists of three equations with the unknowns e x, b ; and m. As before, globalization is modelled by an increase in the number of countries k. Allowing for free entry leads to a new channel of adjustment compared to section 3.4. Foreign competition forces producers with high agency costs to exit the market which is captured by a decrease in the cuto value b :
Furthermore, the number of rms reacts to globalization as follows:
The net e ect depends on the degree of competition. If the substitutability of products is high (large e), globalization reduces the number of domestic rms.
Proposition 8 With free entry, globalization forces the most nancially constrained producers to exit the market. The number of rms decreases if the degree of competition is su ciently high.
Proof. See Appendix 8.3.
Comparable to Proposition 2 in section 3.4, the dominating market size e ect leads to an increase in average industry scale and a lower share of nancially unconstrained producers:
Hence, the e ects of globalization are robust to free entry. In section 4.2, we introduce a capital market equilibrium and show that globalization leads to a higher within-industry variance of rm sales and prices. This e ect is driven by an increase in capital demand which rises the interest rate. To show that this channel of adjustment is still present, capital demand has to increase even with free entry. As the number of domestic rms could fall after globalization (see Proposition 8), the e ect on aggregate capital demand cme x might be reversed. Solving for the number of rms from equation (33) and multiplying with equation (36), leads to total output of domestic producers:
This expression only depends on the cuto value b which decreases with globalization. Hence, aggregate capital demand is clearly increasing with free entry. This implies that the driving force behind the rise in the interest rate remains when the number of rms is endogenous.
Conclusion
This paper has developed a new international trade model with rm-speci c credit frictions and endogenous adjustments of capital costs in general equilibrium. A key element of our model is that credit constraints at the rm-level interact with capital market imperfections at the country-level. Credit frictions arise from a simple moral hazard problem, whereas rms di er in their exposure to nancial constraints. Our model is consistent with new empirical patterns from enterprise surveys data of the World Bank. We show that the majority of variation in exposure to nancial constraints is across rms within an industry. Furthermore, this paper highlights a positive relationship between the degree of product market competition and the share of nancially constrained rms. Additionally, our framework rationalizes a positive relationship between measures of credit constraints both at the industry-as well as the country-level and the variance of sales. We use this model to analyze the e ects of globalization on rm performance and consumer welfare. The main idea is that aggregate implications of trade liberalization are very di erent if general equilibrium e ects on capital costs are taken into account. In general equilibrium, we show that endogenous adjustments of capital costs represent an additional channel which reduces gains from trade. Trade liberalization increases capital demand which pushes the borrowing rate upwards. This general equilibrium e ect induces a within-sector reallocation of pro ts towards unconstrained rms at the expense of nancially constrained producers, and increases the share of credit-rationed producers. We show that these adjustments increase the variance of prices and reduce consumer welfare.
From a policy perspective, our model implies that trade liberalization could lead to negative welfare e ects and should be accompanied by nancial reforms to counteract an increase in within-industry heterogeneity across rms. This implication is especially relevant in developing countries where credit frictions are signi cant and nancial development is low.
8 Mathematical Appendix
Comparative statics in partial equilibrium
The partial equilibrium is characterized by two endogenous variables e and e
x in equations (12) and (15). Totally di erentiating the two equilibrium conditions and writing the results in matrix notation yields:
"
(2 e) (1 e) + 2 e e ekm 0 em (1 ) (2 e) crL The determinant of the coe cient matrix is given by:
(2 e) (1 e) + 2 e e ekm i > 0:
In the following, we proof Proposition 2 in the main body and show partial equilibrium results for an exogenous change in the nancial development parameter .
Proposition 2 (Interest rate e ect) In partial equilibrium, we analyze the e ects of an exogenous change in the interest rate r. The e ect on average industry scale e x is given by:
The e ect on the cuto e is given by: 
To derive the latter expression, note that 1 e 0 c = R 1 e i di = 1 e 2 2 . Proof. To show that d ln e d ln r < 0, it is su cient to proof that (2 e) e 1+ e 2 2 > 0. As the latter expression increases in e , inserting the lowest possible cuto value e l = 1 2 e (see Condition 2 in the main body), we derive (2 e) 2 1 2(2 e) 2 > 0.
Financial development For the sake of completeness, we present the results for an exogenous change in the parameter which are not discussed in the main body of the paper. The e ect on average industry scale e x is given by:
d ln e x d ln =
(2 e) 1 e 0 c cr h
(2 e) (1 e) + 2 e e ekm i b 0 e x > 0:
The solution for the e ect on the cuto value is d ln e d ln = 1
(1 e) (2 e) e + ekm (2 e) e 1+ e 2 2 h (2 e) (1 e) + 2 e e ekm i e > 0;
whereby the proof of Proposition 2 ensures that d ln e d ln > 0.
Comparative statics in general equilibrium
In general equilibrium, we add the capital market clearing condition to our system of equations. The three endogenous variables e , e x, and r are determined in equations (12), (15), and (20) . Totally di erentiating these expressions results in the following matrix equation: 
The e ect of globalization on the cuto level e is given by:
h 2 e e + (2 e) 1 e 0 c (1 )
Comparing the e ects on e in partial and general equilibrium, as shown in equations (17) and (46) (47) whereas the proof in Proposition 2 ensures that the last term is positive.
Proposition 4 (Firm-level e ects of globalization) Inserting the interest rate e ect of globalization (45) into equations (25) and (26) leads to the following expressions:
2 e e + (2 e) 1 e 0 c (1 )
< 0:
As x U > e x and 1 e 2 e e +(2 e)(1 e ) 0 c (1 ) < 1, the e ect of globalization on unconstrained output (48) is clearly positive.
Proof. In the case of constrained rms, note that x C ( ) < e x. A su cient condition for a negative e ect of globalization on constrained output is that the last fraction of expression (49) is larger than one. This is the case if (i) > 1 e 2 2 . Evaluating this condition for the marginal rm with (i) = e and inserting the lower bound e l leads to:
Thus, the e ect of globalization is negative for all rms with (i) e .
Proposition 5 (Financial development) The e ect of nancial development on the cuto level e is given by:
Following the proof in Proposition 2, the expression is clearly positive. Finally, the e ect of an exogenous change in on the interest rate is given by: 
Proof. As the numerator of the term in brackets increases in e , we insert the lower bound e l = 1 2 e which leads to: (2 e) 2 1 2(2 e) > 0.
Comparative statics with free entry
This section presents comparative statics results for a globalization shock (increase in number of countries k) in the case of free entry. The three endogenous variables m, b , and e x are determined in equations (33), (34), and (36). We totally di erentiate these expressions which leads to the following system of equations: The determinant of the coe cient matrix is given by:
F E = 6b 02 eke x (2 e) 2 (1 e) [(1 ) cr] 2 e 2 (6 e) + 5 (2 3e) b 2 > 0:
Proposition 8 The e ect of globalization on the cuto value b can be written as:
and the impact on the number of rms m is given by:
Combining expressions (33) and (34) 
Robustness checks for empirical patterns
This part shows that the empirical patterns presented in section 2.2 are robust to the inclusion of controls at the rm-as well as the industry level. Table 4 describes the variables used in the empirical analysis. Empirical pattern 2 shows that industries with a higher degree of product competition are characterized by a larger fraction of nancially constrained rms. We estimate the following equation:
whereas Constrained ci is the share of nancially constrained rms within an industry i in country c. The variable Comp ci denotes the industry mean of the degree of competition (see Table 4 ). We control for a set of rm characteristics X f and include country xed e ects c and year dummies t . Column (1) of Table 9 shows results for this speci cation and highlights that the positive relationship between competition and the share of nancially constrained rms is robust. As a further robustness check, we use the rm-level variable for access to external nance instead of the industry share in regression (56). Column (2) shows that credit-rationing is positively associated with tougher competition. The advantage of the rm-level regression is that we further control for industry-xed e ects at the 4-digit level.
Empirical pattern 3 states that more nancially constrained industries show a larger within-industry variance of sales. A major concern is that this relationship might be driven by rm heterogeneity with respect to productivity and size, or innovation activity. To address this issue, we run the following regression:
whereas V ariance ci is the within-industry variance of rm sales and T OA ci denotes the industry-mean of tangible over total assets. Column (1) of Table 10 shows the results. In columns (2)-(3), we replace the industry-mean T OA ci with nancial development at the country-level for cross-sectional data in years 2009 and 2013. This speci cation allows us to include industry-xed e ects at the 4-digit level. Columns (4) and (5) show that the negative relationship between nancial development and the variance of sales holds at the country-level, when we use the within-country variance of sales as dependent variable. In a last step, we do a similar exercise for the e ect of nancial development F inDev c on the share of credit-rationed producers, as shown by the following regression:
The rst two columns of Table 11 show the estimation results. Analogous to empirical pattern 2, we use the rm-level variable for access to external nance as dependent variable and show that the signi cantly negative relationship can be con rmed at the rm-level (see columns 3 and 4). 
